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Reporting on Risk:Who Decides What's News?
William Lanouette*

Introduction
Some editors take offense when a "news release" arrives on their
desk, but look more kindly on a "press release" - because they think
it's their job to decide what's news. At times, however, it takes more
than an editor's whim to decide what's news, especially among the
national news media, as two stories about the radiation risks posed by
federal government programs demonstrate.
The first story broke in the national media in October 1988 with
revelations of serious nuclear reactor accidents and radiation risks to
workers, the public, and the environment; the second, in December
1993, identified six of the eighteen persons injected with plutonium in
federal radiation experiments, cited scores more subjects of similar
federal programs, and reported hundreds more experiments on
unidentified persons as well as deliberate radioactive releases from
federal facilities close to inhabited areas.
Yet both stories were known generally to reporters for years before.
Both stories had already been covered in a few regional, specialized, and
national publications. And both stories had been the subject of
congressional hearings and reports. On their own, these two stories
about radiation risks had been considered marginal, or regional, or too
specialized for widespread attention. Both became national stories only
when new elements were added.
The public and public officials learn the most about various risks
from the news media, often in dramatic and abbreviated forms: in
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breathless news "updates" and banner headlines. Health and safety
issues, as well as subtler questions about environmental destruction or
medical ethics, must filter through an information system that thrives
on specific events, novelty, and drama. In that context, a general risk
such as radiation exposure is usually too subtle or too complex to gain
national prominence. But add an ingredient or two and the subtle can
become simply sensational.
Both the radiation stories in this comparison involve the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE), a federal agency that traces its roots to
the Manhattan Project that built the first A-bombs during World War
II. Since then all information about the atom was considered to be
"born classified," an obsession that had forced reporters to use the
Freedom of Information Act to obtain the most basic information
about federal programs - or to rely on leaks from within the DOE
bureaucracy. Such breeches of secrecy can make almost any disclosure
seem newsworthy, although with the two stories here considered
reporters had help from the highest inside source possible: the Secretary
of Energy.
* In October 1988, the issues that made for a national story were
national security, raised by reporters, and the federal budget deficit,
raised by the Energy Secretary's call for increased spending on the
nuclear weapons complex. At the time, the Secretary admitted using
disclosures about problems throughout the complex to gain more
money from Congress and the White House.
- In December 1993, the issues that made for a national story were
the names and personal histories of previously anonymous human
subjects in radiation experiments involving plutonium injections,
augmented by the Energy Secretary's offer to compensate victims. At
the time, the Secretary admitted using her further disclosure of details
about radiation victims and secret nuclear weapons tests to enhance the
department's credibility and to gain public trust for her department and for the Clinton Administration.
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October 1988: The Nuclear Weapons Complex Scandal
Becomes a National Story
For more than a decade, pieces of a nationwide scandal had
surfaced from the vast and sprawling system that produces America's
nuclear weapons; as health, safety; and environmental stories at the
eighteen federal facilities in twelve states. News accounts had appeared
for years in the regional and local press, and, occasionally, as feature
articles in specialized magazines such as Science, Technology Review,
and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. But with few exceptions, the
weapons-making system itself was never considered to have national
significance. Its costs were buried in the Energy Department's budget,
its policies and procedures were concealed in military secrecy, and its
dangers were only seen in remote areas by workers and local residents
who depended on these very facilities for their livelihood.
But in October 1988, problems created during decades of urgent
Cold War production suddenly attracted and held full attention as
front-page features in the country's leading newspapers, as cover stories
in the weekly news magazines, and as sensational items on the
commercial television news programs. 1 Coverage began after a
September 30th congressional hearing on tritium production at the
Energy Department's Savannah River Plant (SRP) near Aiken, South
Carolina. Nuclear reactors at SRP made two products essential for Hbombs: tritium, a form of hydrogen gas used to boost thermonuclear
explosions, and metallic plutonium, the principal explosive ingredient.
The hearing chairmen released a 1985 memorandum by an engineer
with E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., the contractor that had operated
SRP since it opened in 1952. His memo offered the first public tally of
30 serious accidents involving the site's nuclear reactors. Some of these
accidents had melted radioactive fuel. Some had released radiation into
the atmosphere and ground water. Some had been rumored, and one or
two were even covered in local news accounts of SRP operations. But
1
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military secrecy and employee loyalty had kept most of these alarming
details from the national press and public for as long as three decades.
During the previous August, the national media had reported that
SRP's last operating tritium-production reactor had to shut down for
safety problems. But that closure and then the memo's details still
failed to turn the faltering weapons complex into a national news story.
In fact, it took a dedicated effort by writers and editors at the New
York Times to draw attention to the weapons-production story: first by
running front-page articles of their own; second, by attracting other
news media to cover the story; and third, by weaving together old and
new information about the twelve-state complex and its problems. The
New York Times had been preparing a four-part series on problems
with the military atom even before the DuPont memo's release, but
that document provided both the "news" (30 accidents) and the "peg"
(the hearing) on which to hang the paper's more thorough coverage.
On the day after the hearing, the New York Times played the
DuPont memo on page one. And for the first eleven days in October, it
alone among national publications featured front-page articles on the
weapons-production scandal. No other national paper carried its own
story until October 6, a day the Times ran two front-page articles and a
third inside.
With the New York Times clearly in the lead, two other nationally
important papers eventually picked up the story on October 7: the Wall
Street Journal and the Christian Science Monitor. From October to
December 1988, the Washington Post carried 21 articles, seven on the
front page; the Los Angeles Times ran 46 articles, seven on the front
page; and the Wall Street Journal ran 21, also seven on the front page.
Yet none of these matched the constant and aggressive coverage of
the New York Times, which during October ran 20 front-page stories
about the weapons-production complex, and another sixteen inside.
From October 1, when it broke the DuPont memo story, until the end
of December 1988, it ran more than 85 articles about the weapons
complex, 39 played on the front page.

lanouette: Who Decides Whaes News? 227

Some Times articles were based on interviews with Energy
Department officials, some on congressional hearings and
investigations, and some on documents obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act. But many Times stories were "recycled" from pieces
printed years before and from work for the four-part series. 2 By late
October, it was clear that the Times had begun something rare in
3
modern journalism: a "crusade."
What ultimately made the Times effort a national phenomenon was
not the paper's own zeal, however, but the addition of two new
elements to an already familiar regional and specialized story: fresh
fears about the federal budget deficit and national security.
First, beginning in the spring of 1988, the Energy Department had
warned its oversight committees in Congress that maintaining and
modernizing the weapons complex would be far costlier than had been
estimated earlier - a message that shocked the White House during an
election year in which the federal deficit was an issue dividing
Democrats and Republicans. In this context, DOE's usually arcane
budget had serious national significance.
Second, when safety problems at the Savannah River Plant halted all
tritium production in August, breaking a vital link in the chain of
weapons-production sites, the whole complex was finally seen as a failed
national network. For the first time since the atomic age began in 1945,
the U.S. could no longer make and maintain its nuclear arsenal. This
raised new national-security fears.
The New York Times was the first national publication to highlight
the tritium-production issue, in an October 9 front-page article.
Keeping the SRP reactors out of service, an administration official said,
"is tantamount to unilateral nuclear disarmament." Fear of a tritium
shortage provided DOE with a new justification for boosting its
weapons-complex budget, creating a "press agent's dream" for Energy
Secretary John Herrington as he appeared on national television
2 Keith Schneider interview, Nov. 21, 1988.
3 William Lanouette, The Half-life of the Tritium Story, Deadline (Center for
War, Peace, and the News Media; New York University) Jan./Feb. 1989.
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programs to explain the predicament. Two days after the Times made
this national-security point, Deputy Energy Secretary Joseph F. Salgado
announced costly new plans for re-starting SRP's tritium-production
reactor, thus promising that DOE could "assure a continued strategic
deterrent." Risks posed by the complex were no greater than before,
and may even had diminished with no reactors running. Yet, for the
press and public, fearsome coverage was just beginning.
Prime-time television documentaries had flashed alarming views of
the complex as early as 1977, and in 1985 an ABC Closeup program
described risks posed by radioactive wastes at Savannah River and the
Hanford Reservation in Washington state, said to be two "national
sacrifice areas" that were "so contaminated with weapons waste they
may never again be safe for human habitation." 4 ABC's Closeup
program on "The Bomb Factories" in 1987 pointed out that at
Savannah River "to over stretch a decaying plant risks a catastrophic
accident which could cripple America's only source of nuclear weapons
material ...." That would actually happen a year later, when the tritiumproduction reactors failed.
Yet, except for these special reports, network television had given
little time to the worsening fate of the weapons complex. In 1986 and
1987 there were only four reports on the networks' evening news
programs, all about the Hanford reactor: two when comparisons were
made to the Soviet reactor that had exploded at Chernobyl, and two
when Hanford's plant was shut down for safety repairs. In 1988 there
were no network-news items on the complex until October, when the
DuPont memo became front-page news in the New York Times. By
contrast, after the Times crusade began, there were 23 network reports
in October: twelve about Savannah River, nine about the Fernald
uranium plant in Ohio, six about the Rocky Flats -bomb plant in
Colorado, and two about Hanford. During the first three months of
the scandal, the Times set the news agenda for television coverage but
5
the networks soon lost interest.
4 The Fire Unleashed, ABC News Closeup, Program No. 125, June 6, 1985,
transcript at 17.
5 Compare story topics in Appendices A and C of William Lanouette, Tritium and

Lanouette: Who Decides What's News? 229

In November, with presidential elections over, coverage dropped to
two items about Savannah River and one about Rocky Flats. Then in
December there were ten evening-news reports: three about weaponsplant cleanup and the debate over tritium's scarcity; two about DOE's
budget commitment to clean up the Fernald plant; two about new
cracks discovered in a Savannah River reactor; one about Western
governors refusing to accept radioactive waste from Rocky Fiats; one
about President-Elect George Bush's comment at a press conference
that he had not yet focussed on where to find money for the weapons
complex cleanup; and one about the dispute between DOE and the
White House over expanding the weapons-complex budget.
Like the television networks, the national news magazines also
followed the New York Times closely, and after October 1988 Time,
Newsweek, and US News & World Report seemed to shift focus in
unison as the newspaper's crusade advanced. Of the three, only
Newsweek had touched the subject in 1988 before the Times forced
the issue in October. 6 But following revelations from the DuPont
memo by the New York Times, all three news magazines ran repeated
stories from October to December 1988: Newsweek had four, the
others had three each.
None of the news magazines identified the weapons-complex
scandal as an old story, although Newsweek had written about Fernald
in 1985 and Time had covered a reactor shutdown at Hanford in 1987.
Nor did the news magazines see the spread of the weapons-complex
story as a Washington-based media phenomenon, fed by an agency
eager to publicize its budget plight and fanned by a newspaper intent
on making news. Yet, these were key reasons for their national coverage.

the Times: How the Nuclear-Weapons Production Scandal Became a National Story,
Research Paper R-1. Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics, and Public
Policy (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 1990).
6 In March, Newsweek had reported on reduced tritium reactor levels and minor
radioactive releases at Savannah River.
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December 1993:
Human Radiation Experiments Become a National Story
News that the U.S. Government had used "human guinea pigs" for
radiation experiments in the 1940's and 1950's, and had released
radioactive materials over populated areas to test monitoring
techniques, became national news in December 1993. It began to break
in ways similar to the 1988 weapons-complex scandal, and also needed
two new elements to propel regional and specialized subjects to national
prominence.
In both 1988 and 1993, the basic facts were known to journalists
and public officials. In both 1988 and 1993, the issue was forced by the
appearance of new information: the DuPont memo in 1988; the names,
faces, and personal stories about citizens who had been injected with
plutonium without their full knowledge or consent in 1993. That
added personal element came from tireless research by an Albuquerque
Tribune reporter, Eileen Welsome, whose series appeared in mid
November 1993. As with the 1988 story, in 1993 the Energy Secretary
provided the second and decisive boost to national prominence by
proclaiming during a December 7 press conference that the U.S.
Government acknowledged its wrongdoing in some radiation
experiments, and would compensate victims and their families.
The Washington Post had reported on some human radiation
experiments at the University of Cincinnati as early as 1971, and the
Energy Department's predecessor, the Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA), had issued a six-page press
release in February 1976 that offered "Background Information on
Manhattan Project (MED) Injections of Plutonium into Terminal
Patients." The release explained that with several thousand MED
workers handling plutonium, "accurate information [was) needed on
retention and excretion of internal plutonium for setting safety
criteria." Hospitals were named in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Rochester,
New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. In addition, seven unclassified
7
medical studies were cited offering more details.
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These eighteen plutonium experiments and hundreds more were
described in a 38-page congressional report released in November 1986
by Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.). 8 Missing, however, were the names
of the patients; they were identified only by codes. Ms. Welsome at the
Albuquerque Tribune spent years tracing six of the patients, and when
her series named them and printed their pictures an old and unfocused
story suddenly gained a personal dimension. Yet the Tribune series
went unnoticed by national media for more than three weeks - until
Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary held her nationally-covered December
press conference.
At that conference O'Leary pledged to compensate radiationexperiment victims, giving what had been an old and -unfocused story
new and sensational life. Just as Secretary Herrington had publicized his
department's radiation hazards in order to garner a bigger budget for
environmental and safety programs, Secretary O'Leary used her
revelations to garner much-needed public trust. At her press conference,
she also released the size and location of the U.S. plutonium stockpile
and listed 204 previously-secret nuclear weapons tests, in all issuing 67
pages of "Openness Fact Sheets" to highlight the Clinton
Administration's commitment to public information.
But even then, national media attention lagged. On December 8,
both the New York Times and the Washington Post reported on
O'Leary's press conference, but only mentioned the human radiation
experiments among other disclosures. It wasn't until the 17th that the
New York Times highlighted the human dimension in a front-page
article. The New York Times had already published in early
November - a front-page account of the Cold War's "human guinea
9
pigs" in the former Soviet Union.
7 Fact Sheet on Manhattan Engineer District (MED) Plutonium Excretion Studies,
Feb. 1976, at 2.
8
House Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Power of the Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, American Nuclear Guinea Pigs: Three Decades of Radiation
Experiments on U.S. Citizens (Comm. Print 1986).
9 Marlise Simons, Soviet Atom Test Used Thousands As Guinea Pigs, Archives
Show, New York Times, Nov. 7, 1993, at 1.
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Also setting the scene for the December revelations was Senator
John Glenn (D-Ohio), who had co-chaired the 1988 hearings at which
the DuPont memo was released. In November 1993, Glenn issued an
unclassified report by the U.S. General Accounting Office about four
areas in which radiation was released over inhabited areas in
Washington state, New Mexico, Utah, and Tennessee. 10 The GAO
report offered the public its first detailed information about the high
dosage levels and dubious purpose of these releases: to improve the U.S.
ability to monitor fallout from Soviet nuclear tests and weapons
production.
Conclusion
These 1988 and 1993 stories demonstrate the ways that risks alone
do not become newsworthy for the general public until they acquire a
national context. New facts, such as the DuPont memo or
unacknowledged radiation victims, do not necessarily command
national media attention until their implications are framed by broader
national issues: in 1988, by new concerns with national security and the
federal budget deficit; in 1993, by personal identities that humanized
hundreds of statistical victims and occasioned the administration's
commitment to new openness and the promise of some compensation.
For, without those elements the safety and health problems in the
nuclear weapons complex and the use of human subjects for radiation
experiments would have continued to attract local, regional, and
specialist coverage - but probably not the attention of the national
news media.

10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Health And Safety: Examples of Post
World War II Radiation Releases at U.S. Nuclear Sites (1993).

